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artl_a_00094. Subscription required.Abstract Living agency is subject to a normative dimension
(good-bad, adaptive-maladaptive) that is absent from other types
of interaction. We review current and historical attempts to naturalize
normativity from an organism-centered perspective, identifying two
central problems and their solution: (1) How to define the topology
of the viability space so as to include a sense of gradation that
permits reversible failure, and (2) how to relate both the processes
that establish norms and those that result in norm-following
behavior. We present a minimal metabolic system that is coupled
to a gradient-climbing chemotactic mechanism. Studying the
relationship between metabolic dynamics and environmental
resource conditions, we identify an emergent viable region and a
precarious region where the system tends to die unless environmental
conditions change. We introduce the concept of normative field as
the change of environmental conditions required to bring the
system back to its viable region. Norm-following, or normative action,
is defined as the course of behavior whose effect is positively
correlated with the normative field. We close with a discussion
of the limitations and extensions of our model and some final
reflections on the nature of norms and teleology in agency.1 IntroductionThe subject of biological agency and natural norms is attracting increasing attention [7, 17, 26, 32,
33, 40, 42, 51, 58, 59], and artificial life is very well suited to make some conceptual progress on key
aspects of agency and its origins. In fact, minimal models of agency have been a recurring topic in
the field, from protocellular models to robotics—see [7] for references.
From bacteria to humans, the way in which living systems actively regulate their relationship with
their environments strongly contrasts with inanimate objects. Whereas the behavior of living systems
generally qualifies as agency, the inanimate world is a world of events. Part of this distinction between
actions and events lies in the normative character of the former. Actions are subject to normative judgment :
They are either good or bad, appropriate or inappropriate, adaptive or maladaptive. A bacterium might
be described as failing to move up a sugar gradient, but it makes little (if any) sense to say that a planet hasof Science, UPV/EHU University of the Basque
n, U.K.
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capture the attention of philosophers, theoretical biologists, psychologists, and roboticists alike, for it has
proven to be a difficult property to define, naturalize, model, or synthesize.
A recent article [7] described normativity as one of the essential features of an agent, which is defined
as “an autonomous organization capable of adaptively regulating its coupling with the environment
according to the norms established by its own viability conditions” [7, p. 376]. The main goal of this
article is to make explicit what is meant by the expression “according to the norms established by its
own viability conditions.” Similar expressions have been used [8, 16, 26, 40, 59], but no model has yet
been developed to illustrate and describe in detail the meaning of this expression and others closely
associated with it.
We shall start by introducing the problem of normativity and agency in more detail and identifying
the two most prominent theories that are currently available for naturalizing a notion of proper, or non-
derived, normativity: the evolutionary and the organizational (or organismic) accounts of normative
function. We then focus on those developments of the organizational approach that have had more
impact in the fields of cybernetics, artificial life, and adaptive behavior. Having set up the context
and identified some key problems of previous approaches, we describe our minimal model. The model
covers “norm-establishing” and “norm-following” aspects. First we describe a minimal metabolic sys-
tem that allows us to define norm-establishing at the protocellular scale. A parametric analysis of changes
in environmental conditions of metabolism allows us to define and quantify the notions of “precarious-
ness,” “viability,” and “normativity” in terms of regions inside the viability space. Next, we move into
norm-following by adding a chemotactic behavioral mechanism to the metabolic system just described. By
projecting the effect of chemotactic behavior into the viability space, we can precisely define “normative
behavior” and characterize an adaptive region that emerges from the relational dynamics between agent
and environment. Then, we provide a set of generalized definitions that are applicable beyond our
model. We end up with some possible extensions of our model and some discussion about the nature
of norms and teleology in agency.2 Agency, Adaptivity, and Normativity2.1 The Framework: Events versus Actions, Descriptive versus Normative,
and the Challenge of Natural Norms
In a world of events that science describes as governed by necessary laws and principles, the concept of
agency can appear to be in tension with the very method and assumptions of science. The notion of agency
has been traditionally [24] formulated as behavior caused or motivated by reasons, desires, or intentions
and as opposed to just antecedent events: To run home so as to protect yourself from a storm is not the
same as being pushed by the wind. In a world of fundamental particles governed by laws there seems to
be no room for agency—no way to formulate a concept of what processes or interactions ought to be,
or are intended to be, as different from what they actually are; no room for norms that can be violated so
that an agent might be said to fail. And yet we have the experience of acting, of following or failing to
follow certain norms (be they biological, psychological, or social).
Ultimately, filling in the gap between fundamental physics and our own experience of agency might
require the inclusion of concepts such as “will,” “awareness,” or “reasons” into the explanatory picture.
But minimal forms of natural behavior (such as chemotaxis) encapsulate some of the most important
properties of “higher” levels of agency [7], and their explanation can arguably be considered a pre-
requisite to ground and naturalize the very notion of agency and its more complex manifestations.
It has long been argued that there is continuity between biological and human agency [15, 17, 33,
42, 56, 58, 59]: that human agency is a natural complexification of lower forms of agency, where “natural
complexification” implies no fundamental discontinuity nor the addition of essentially different prin-
ciples. Without explicitly attaching to a strong continuity thesis, however, it seems reasonable to assume
that the modeling and conceptualization of biological agency (even of the simplest forms) constitutes
a valuable conceptual and methodological resource for making progress toward higher forms of6 Artificial Life Volume 20, Number 1
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modeling, and formalization than psychological, ethical, or social forms. It therefore provides a
solid departure point to investigate the nature of agency.
One of the key properties of agency that shows up across different levels is normativity, the dimen-
sion of behavior in which value comes into play. Actions are good or bad, adaptive or maladaptive,
appropriate or inappropriate [8, 17, 21]. The issue of normativity has several manifestations and a
long philosophical and theoretical history. One of its earlier formulations comes from David Hume,
who noted the “impossibility” of deriving ought from is, prescriptive statements from descriptive ones.
There seems to be no justified manner in which (no matter how many) statements about “X being
or operating as A” can lead to a valid inference about “X having to be or having to operate as A.”
This has important consequences for the fixation of epistemological norms (those concerning how
knowledge or truth must be achieved or justified) and ethical norms (how we ought to behave). Immanuel
Kant provided an additional decisive contribution: He proposed that epistemological and ethical
norms were to be found and justified as conditions of possibility. The Humean problem could thus be
solved: it is not that norms about how X should be are to be derived of inferred from what X actually
is, but instead from what makes possible the very existence of X.1 In this way the normative shows itself
not as an empirical fact, but as what makes possible that we apprehend empirical phenomena or
ascertain reasons to act in the first place.
The issue of norms has had an enormous development in the areas of epistemology and ethics
since then, but this is out the scope of the present article. What is relevant to us is the naturalist turn
that some of these developments took, in contrast to those trends that argued merely in terms of
abstract reasons or the very structure of logic or language use. Naturalism tries to bring philosophical
problems down to the grounds of natural sciences [49]: something that can be measured. And there
is an empirical manifestation of epistemic (and ethical) normativity: behavior. So, if we are to assume
that normativity does not belong to a supernatural sphere, then the behavior of living systems might
be a good entry point for trying to explain and model it. Of course, moving into the realm of biology
does not automatically solve the theoretical challenges posed by normativity, but it does reframe the
questions: When we model the mechanisms of natural behavior and they lead to a specific outcome,
how can we justify the claim that the animal has failed or that it should had done something else?
Where do the norms against which natural behavior is evaluated or judged come from? How do they
relate to behavior-generating mechanisms? Can new norms appear in nature? How does the actual
functioning, here and now, of a behavioral mechanism differ from how it ought to function? Is it possible
to address these questions in a manner that is centered on the organism and not on aspects of its
evolutionary history or on other agentsʼ intentions?2.2 Intrinsic and Derived Norms in Natural and Artificial Systems
While artificial systems can be judged to operate in relation to norms, these norms have (thus far )
always been predefined by the designer of the artificial system or interpreted by an external observer
or user. In other words, what is good or bad functioning for a robot, a car, or a coffee machine
has been a matter of the design specifications, which are largely independent from the ongoing
operation of the artifact. In a sense we can talk of derived or extrinsic normativity: The artifact does
not possess or define any purpose of and by itself, but always in relation to some external agent
or social context from which such a purpose or norm is derived. So, for instance, the decision of
when and how to repair the artifact (i.e., what counts as broken) depends on the design specifica-
tions of the designer, the social context of its use, or simply the pragmatic intentions of the end user,
but not on any intrinsic property of the system itself. The same physical object can be either broken1 Some contemporary approaches to social norms [2, 37] might help to make this philosophical point more clear: “do not lie” is a social norm
for linguistic behavior, because being truthful is a condition of the possibility of linguistic communication, or inversely, if everybody were to
lie all the time, it would be impossible to communicate.
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biological organisms, which seem to “respond” to norms that are more closely related to their
organization.
There is a possible analogy between the norms that a designer or context imposes upon an
artifact and the norms that natural evolutionary “design” might impose upon organisms. And this
analogy has inspired what currently stands as the mainstream approach to naturalizing norms. The
most celebrated exponent of the so-called selected-function or evolutionary approach is Millikan [46].
She defends a whole philosophical program to naturalize biological, cognitive, and epistemological
norms in evolutionary theory. Roughly speaking, behavior is here considered to be normative
or adaptive if it has been selected by evolution. Under this view, adaptation is ultimately a result
of natural selection, and it is only as a result of a process of selection that a character or process
(e.g., a pattern of behavior ) can be said to be adaptive or maladaptive. What sets up the norm is
the history of population dynamics. In this view an organ or a particular behavioral mechanism
might be said to be broken, be maladaptive, or fail to carry out its proper function if it is cur-
rently working in a manner that was not the mode of functioning that evolution selected for.
Artificial life models have contributed to clarifying and quantifying this notion of normativity and
teleology [11].2
An alternative conception of normativity that is intrinsic, or non-derived, can be developed
with criteria that are independent from history or the social context of design and use, and
are instead grounded on the current organization of the system and its ongoing dynamics. This
is precisely the motivation underlying the main alternative approach to normativity and adapta-
tion. The organizational approach (as it might be called) puts the idea of autonomy (from the Greek
autos = self and nomos = norm) at its center [9, 25, 55, 60]. This approach sees the norms of a sys-
tem as being determined by its present organization. This results in an inversion of the selected-
function approach: A trait does not acquire a normative function because it has been selected,
but it has been selected because it came to fill a normative function within a living systemʼs
organization.2.3 The Organismic Approach to Biological Autonomy: A Short
Historical Introduction
The origins of this organism-centered or autonomous-organizational approach can be traced back to
the works of Aristotle and, particularly, to Kant (Critique of Judgement) and his account of teleology as
emerging from the self-organization (a term that is due precisely to him) of living systems. This trend
of thought was further developed within German idealism and the so-called Naturphilosophie school,
but it was not until the late nineteenth century that it started to take on a more detailed empirical
taste, with the rise of cell theory and experimental physiology—for example, the work of Claude
Bernard and his conception of the milieu interieur [13]. We can observe an influential integration of
this organismic trend in biology in the work of Walter B. Cannon and his development of the concept
of homeostasis as the “coordinated physiological processes which maintain most of the steady states in
the organism” [20].
But it is perhaps the work of Canguilhem [18] that most directly addressed the issue of nor-
mativity in biology. As noted in [35], Canguilhem further develops some of the central ideas
already anticipated in Kurt Goldsteinʼs masterpiece Der Aufbau des Organismus, where the issue
of normativity is directly linked to the individual organism: “there is only one relevant norm;
that which includes the total concrete individuality; that which takes the individual as its measure”
[36, p. 269].32 A detailed critique of evolutionary accounts of function, purpose, teleology, or intentionality and its relation to intrinsic or non-derived
purpose can be found elsewhere [21, 47].
3 Quotation borrowed from [35].
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tion mean is a valid departure point for approaching pathologies in organisms. Instead, he introduces
the notion of normativity at the very core of the living individual in a sense that connects directly with
the contemporary debate on norms:
[L]ife is in fact a normative activity. The normative, in philosophy, includes every judgment
which evaluates or qualifies a fact in relation to a norm, but this mode of judgment is
essentially subordinate to that which establishes norms. The normative, in the fullest sense
of the word, is that which establishes norms. And it is in that sense that we plan to talk
about biological normativity. [19, pp. 126–127]
A fundamental distinction introduced by Canguilhem is that between norm-establishing and norm-
following [50]. Organisms do not only operate according to norms, that is, they do not only seem to
follow norms, but they also establish these norms autonomously. How exactly this occurs (and how
it contrasts with the processes described by physics) was a central contribution of Hans Jonasʼ philo-
sophical biology. Metabolism defines the organism as an individual that escapes the determination
of its constituent parts by renewing them continuously, leaving the form or organization of the sys-
tem as the persistent reference identity. The more complex it is, the more precarious and the
more threatened by the environment a living system becomes, and yet, the more in need of its
environment. To do is both the consequence and the condition of possibility of the very existence
of an organism:
“To be” is its intrinsic goal. Teleology comes in where the continuous identity of being
is not assured by mere inertial persistence of a substance, but is continually executed by
something done, and by something which has to be done in order to stay on at all: it is
a matter of to-be-or-not-to-be whether what is to be done is done. [39, p. 243]
In this way, Jonas shows how individuality and normativity get intertwined: norms apply to natural
identities, which, unlike inanimate objects, depend on their own, continuous action of metabolic
renewal and resource seeking for their ongoing existence. This recursive nature of living organization
allows one to derive the norms, not directly from isolated events (as the problem was originally posed
by Hume), but from the set of organized and interdependent processes that constitute an organism
(i.e., its conditions of possibility).
These arguments suggest inspiring and convincing research avenues, but there remains a large
gap between this philosophy and scientific modeling and experimentation. Notions of “identity,”
“precariousness,” “preservation,” or “need” require far more detailed development to be consistently
assembled to deliver a clear scientific notion of normative action. It is through the relatively modern
development of cybernetics, theoretical biology, and the physics and chemistry of far-from-equilibrium
systems that this tradition is progressively entering, albeit partially and not without difficulties, into a
proper scientific treatment of normative action.
A branch of contemporary theoretical biology, under the label of autopoietic theory or enactivism
[16, 26, 44, 60, 61] and autonomous systems [8, 10, 22, 23, 42, 54, 55] has further elaborated some
of the central tenets of the organicist school, connecting them with contemporary biology, artificial
life, and cognitive science. Of particular relevance is the work by Christensen and Bickhard [21], who
provide a detailed philosophical discussion of the notion of normative function within the context of
contemporary philosophy of biology and cognitive science—see also [47] for a more recent version
of “normative function” in biology. The central claim of these developments is that the normative
nature of biological functions stems from the far-from-equilibrium and self-sustaining nature of the
networked processes that constitute living organization.
However, putting these theoretical approaches to work in scientific modeling requires bridging the
gap that separates conceptual and philosophical contributions from mathematical and computationalArtificial Life Volume 20, Number 1 9
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a formulation that can shed light on some of its most intricate problems.
2.4 Adaptive Behavior and Viability: Contemporary Theories and
Modeling Frameworks
The contemporary conception of the organizational approach contends that norms are to be found
as conditions for the viability of a system: conditions of self-maintenance or closure conditions.
Examples and theoretical tools are often drawn from the adaptive behavior literature, where such
norms are pictured as “viability constraints” or “viable region(s)” within a “viability space” defined
by different physiological variables (see Figure 1). Ashbyʼs influential work [3] contributed to the
formalization of this framework. First, he translated into the concept of “essential variables” what
Claude Bernard called “internal milieu” and Walter Cannon called “homeostatic variables.” Within
the multidimensional space defined by those variables he defined the “viable or homeostatic region”
as the subspace where the system was to remain alive or viable.
This way of conceiving and formalizing adaptivity had considerable influence. In ethology, ani-
mal behavior has been modeled as responding to the maintenance of these essential variables
(physiologically measured or measurable: e.g., temperature, food or hydration levels) within their
viability boundaries [45]. A similar approach is taken by Beerʼs research in adaptive behavior, where
he defines a systemʼs behavior as adaptive “only so long as it succeeds in maintaining its trajectory
within this viability constraint, that is, only so long as it succeeds in maintaining the conditions
necessary for its continued existence” [12, p. 266]. Abstractions of these conditions (or functionally
specified boundaries of viability) have been used to design robot controllers [14]. And a detailed
formal development of some of these issues is due to Jean-Pierre Aubinʼs viability theory—see [4]
for the latest version.
2.5 Current Problems with Modeling Viability Boundaries and the Nature
of Norms
In terms of modeling, the organizational or organismic account of natural norms has translated into
the notion of boundaries of viability (following the work of Ashby). The fundamental norm is “do
not cross the boundary”; the viability constraints have to be respected. The origin of these boundaries
is given by chemical rates (energetic, kinetic, etc.) and physical constraints and their interdependencesFigure 1. Standard representation of viability space: A viable region (gray area) and adaptive behavior (trajectories) are
illustrated for two essential variables (food and water ). Outside the viable region the system will die. Viable trajectories
are those that remain within the viability boundaries.10 Artificial Life Volume 20, Number 1
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recursive self-maintenance of the organism, such as blood circulation and respiration.4
There is, however, a problem with how this notion of boundaries of viability has been modeled
and conceptualized so far:
1. The problem of boundaries. If the notion of viability constraint or boundary is normatively rigid
(meaning the system is dead once crossed), then the norm is all-or-nothing and there is no room for
reversible failure, no gradation. If the boundary is not rigid, then how can we quantify its “flexibility”?
Are there alternative conceptions of the viability space that can accommodate gradation—intermediate
spaces or wide “boundaries” before an irreversible state is reached? How can we quantify and qualify a
richer topology of the viability space?
Ezequiel Di Paolo has identified a similar problem in autopoietic theory, and he attempted to
solve it by providing what remains perhaps the most complete and explicit of current definitions
of adaptivity [26]:
a systemʼs capacity, in some circumstances, to regulate its states and its relation to
the environment with the result that, if the states are sufficiently close to the boundary
of viability, 1. tendencies are distinguished and acted upon depending on whether the
states will approach or recede from the boundary and, as a consequence, 2. tendencies
of the first kind are moved closer to or transformed into tendencies of the second
and so future states are prevented from reaching the boundary with an outward
velocity. [26, p. 436]
The issue of normativity can be explicitly re-framed under this definition as the requirement
to “prevent” those tendencies of essential variables that might approximate the boundaries “with
an outward velocity.” There remain, however, some ambiguities in Di Paoloʼs definition that
prevent straightforward quantification and measurement of normative action: How much is “suf-
ficiently close” to the boundaries of viability so that a regulation becomes adaptive? How are “veloc-
ities” and “tendencies” defined and modeled? Are there different types of boundaries within the
viability space? Are cases like the trajectory that repeatedly crosses the boundary of viability in
Figure 1 possible?
The crucial contribution of Di Paoloʼs definition is that it introduces a dimension of temporality
and velocity into the notion of adaptivity and norms that deserves more attention than what previous
conceptions of viability have paid. Essential variables have tendencies or velocities in relation to which
normative action has to be defined. Normativity is not only a question of boundaries or constraints
that need just to be respected, but, so to speak, a question of forces and tendencies that have to be
compensated for.
In addition, most of the models that have been previously developed suffer a different type of
problem (yet somewhat related to the previous one):
2. The problem of dissociation between norm-establishing and norm-following processes. Existing models of
viability appear dissociated into two categories: (i) those where viability boundaries appear as given
or defined from without and where the models focus on how to shape adaptive dynamics to main-
tain the trajectories of essential variables within those boundaries; and (ii) those where a set of
viability conditions emerge out of metabolic or physiological process but do not address behavior4 So, for example: Imagine that above 57°C reaction rates increase so that waste products cannot be released out at sufficient speed and
the cell bursts. The chemical dynamics of the system define this limit of 57°C (should the type and rate of the constituent metabolic
reactions have been different, the system would have had a different boundary of viability). So the behavior of the organism is adaptive
or normative if it avoids letting its physiological processes move beyond the 57°C boundary of viability.
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that control adaptive behavior remain dissociated in existing models.
This problem is rarely acknowledged in the literature and even when recognized it is assumed as a
necessary pragmatic compromise and a valid assumption. So, for instance, Beer states that:
[T]his explicit separation between an animalʼs behavioural dynamics and its viability
constraints is fundamentally somewhat artificial. […] However, if we are willing to take
the existence of an animal for granted, at least provisionally, then we can assume that
its viability constraint is given a priori, and focus instead on the behavioural dynamics
necessary to maintain that existence. [12, p. 265]
To be fair, this is a reasonable simplification when the main focus of interest is the exploration
of behavioral dynamics. However, making progress in the conceptual development of the notion of
normative action and adaptive agency might require one to integrate these two aspects.
In previous work [29, 30] we have explored the relationship between the viability boundary
determining metabolic dynamics and the dynamics that drive organismic behavior. But a fur-
ther problem remained in these and related models: Although the boundaries of viability were
directly linked to the modeled system, they were only defined by the system in a relatively trivial
way. The boundaries of our models and similar ones by others (see, e.g., [53]) were the result of
rough physical magnitudes: disappearance of the protocell due to complete lack of catalysts or
bursting disintegration of the protocell marked by the upper limit of the tension of the membrane.5
The boundaries were not intrinsically emergent from interactions between system processes in
the holistic system-interdependent manner that characterizes integrity and systemic identity in real
organisms.
In natural systems, the limits of viability do not map with the physical disintegration of a system,
but rather with the loss of the capacity of the system to sustain itself. To lose viability is not to dis-
appear altogether, but to cross a much more subtle boundary where self-maintenance is overwhelmed
by processes of degradation—where the system is on a trajectory toward death that can only be
averted by changing the environmental conditions. Often, once viability has been lost, it becomes
increasingly difficult to regain—the loss sometimes reaching a point of no return and becoming
irreversible. This problem connects back to the first one, the nature and rigidity of the boundaries as
standardly conceived by the adaptive behavior literature needs to be revisited. Additional regions within
the space defined by essential variables might be required, and the notion of boundary complemented
with that of a field.
In what follows we shall introduce a minimal model of agency capable of addressing the problems
just presented in this section. We first introduce a model of a minimal protocell-like metabolism
whose dynamics define a precise topology of its viability space. This allows us to identify and illustrate
norm-establishing as emerging from metabolism. For fixed concentrations of available resources, we can
plot a bifurcation diagram of the chemodynamics that indicates the intrinsic boundaries of viability of
the system. Different regions within the viability space will be identified and the adaptive norms of the
system clearly defined and quantified. Next we add chemotactic capacities to the protocell, we put it
in an environment with a chemical metabolic resource gradient, and we study how behavior maps into
the viability space and consider how it can be interpreted as an instance of norm-following behavior. We
then abstract away from our model to more general cases, and we finally come back to the problems
and theoretical discussion opened above.5 This is not to say that existing models assume a naive conception of such boundaries; in the case of [53] the viability boundary of the
membrane is transformed by the addition of peptides that are produced by metabolism and is therefore “modulated” by the system.
However, the only relevant viability boundary considered (although elastic and influenced by the system) is the maximum tension that
the membrane can accommodate before bursting.
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3.1.1 Model Design
The metabolic organization is one of the most fundamental properties of living systems and has
been studied as such by many under the form of autocatalytic networks [41], autopoietic or
autonomous systems [16, 44, 55, 60], fluid machineries like the chemoton model [34], or systems
closed to efficient causation [43, 48, 52]—to mention but some of the most relevant contribu-
tions to a systemic conception that takes metabolic self-organization as the core principle of living
organization.
Real metabolisms are complex networks involving hundreds of metabolites and even more re-
actions. But we are interested in general abstract properties of metabolic networks, so we do not
need to model all of the intricacies. Minimal models with equivalent or similar dynamical properties
to the one we are just about to introduce have been studied before, with theoretical goals that are
continuous with ours, but without explicitly addressing the issue of normativity [16, 48, 63].
We start with the simplest conceivable model, involving the simulation of the concentrations of
two categories of chemical components: autocatalysts (A) and resources or food chemicals (F ). The
abstraction here is high-level; [A] is intended to represent the concentration of all of the different
chemicals involved in an autocatalytic metabolic network, conceptually equivalent to the biomass of
metabolites or an order parameter globally representing metabolic dynamics. Similarly, [F] represents
the concentration of all material and energetic resources necessary for the ongoing functioning of
metabolism.
We consider two processes: (i) the autocatalysis of A, whereby it transforms F into more A, and
(ii) the spontaneous degradation of A into a quickly dissipating, non-reactive waste that has no
subsequent effect upon the system. These two processes are described by the following reaction
equations:
2Aþ F ⇌ 3A
ð1ÞA→ Ø
The following differential equation describes how the concentration of A changes over time:
A ̇½  ¼ −kb½A
3
6
þ kf ½F½A
2
2
−kd ½A ð2Þ
The first term on the right represents the backward reaction 3A→ 2A + F, the second term represents
the forward reaction 2A + F → 3A, and the third term represents the degradation of A into a non-
reactive waste (A → Ø).
The constants (kb = 0.45, kf = 1.0, kd = 1.0) were assigned so that, for low [A], the forward
autocatalytic reaction occurs more rapidly than the backward reaction. This stoichiometry of the
autocatalysis was selected because it results in a bistable system; when the concentration of A is
high, the backward reaction runs more quickly than the forward reaction.3.1.2 Dynamics
Figure 2A shows the influence of each of the three terms on the right-hand side of Equation 2 when
the concentration of F is fixed at 1.4. The backward reaction decreases the concentration of A at aArtificial Life Volume 20, Number 1 13
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degradation reaction decreases [A] at a rate proportional to [A].
As shown in Figure 2B, when [F] = 1.4, the combined effects of the three terms result in two
stable equilibria, at [A] = 0 and [A] = 7.57. In between these two stable equilibria lies an unstable
equilibrium at [A] ≈ 1.76. For [F] = 1.4, only when the concentration of A is above this unstable
equilibrium point is the forward autocatalytic reaction sufficient to counteract the two processes that
decrease the concentration of A.
Figure 3 shows the equilibria for fixed values of [F] between 0 and 2. As could be expected,
when there is a low concentration of F, no matter how high the concentration of A, the sys-
tem is incapable of self-producing at a rate sufficient to compensate for its degradation. This
means that for these low concentrations of F, there is only a single stable equilibrium where
the concentration of autocatalyst is [A] = 0.0. The system bifurcates at [F] ≈ 1.09. For fixed con-
centrations of F greater than this value, the system has two stable equilibria, one where [A] >
0.0, one where [A] = 0.0, and an unstable equilibrium that lies in between. To calculate the value
of [F] at the bifurcation point, we solved Equation 2, identifying the value of [F] where there are
exactly two equilibria, as this is only the case at the bifurcation point. To do so, we first factored
out an A from Equation 2:
A ̇½  ¼ ½A −kb½A
2
6
þ kf ½F ½A
2
−kd
 
ð3ÞFigure 2. Phase portraits the model system for fixed [F] = 1.4. (A) The influence of each of the three terms of the
autocatalytic equation, for the forward autocatalytic reaction (solid), backward autocatalytic reaction (dotted), and
degradation (dashed), is shown. (B) The combined influence of all three terms defines three equilibrium points: left
and right stable equilibria in black, and unstable equilibrium in white. Arrows indicate dynamic tendencies of [A] toward
or away from fixed points.14 Artificial Life Volume 20, Number 1
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occur when what is inside the parentheses equals 0. When we apply the quadratic formula,
x ¼ −b 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
b2 − 4ac
p
2a
ð4Þ
to identify the roots of the quadratic inside the parentheses of Equation 3, it is apparent that there is
only a single additional root when
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
b2 − 4ac
p ¼ 0. Plugging the coefficients into this equation and
then solving for [F], we find the equation that specifies the value of [F] at the bifurcation point:
½F  ¼ 2
kf
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2  kb  kd
3
r
ð5Þ
When we substitute the constants specified above, we find that at the bifurcation point, [F] ≈ 1.09.
3.2 Interpretation
3.2.1 The Topology of the Viability Space: Living, Dead, Precarious, and
Viable Regions
Such a simple model of metabolism suffices to generate a viability space where living, viable, precarious, and
dead regions can be clearly identified. These are highlighted in Figure 4. The dead region corresponds to
zero concentration of the required metabolites (complete disintegration of the system). The arrows in
Figure 4 indicate the general tendency of metabolic dynamics for different regions of the viability
space, superimposed upon the bifurcation diagram shown in Figure 3. A viable region can be preciselyArtificial Life Volume 20, Number 1 15-Figure 3. Bifurcation diagram showing equilibria for different (fixed) concentrations of F, for parametric analysis of [A] equili
brium points for different values of [F]. Unstable equilibria are shown with a dashed line, and two stable equilibra with solid
lines (a trivial equilibrium point at [A] = 0 and a nontrivial one above the unstable equilibrium). See text for details.
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living region where, for each point, the evolution of the system will tend toward the stable living
equilibrium. The unstable equilibrium at the bottom of the viable region defines a boundary of viability
below which the system tends to the dead state.
For small values of [A] and [F] we can distinguish what we have termed a precarious region (medium
gray area in Figure 4), where the system is still alive but will tend to die if the parameter [F] is kept
constant, but can still recover if [F] is appropriately modulated. Underneath the precarious region
a terminal region can also be distinguished (dark gray area in Figure 4). If [A] falls in this region, the
system will be alive for some time, but will irreversibly die. The reasons for this impossibility of
recovering viability are intrinsic limiting factors on the dynamics of change of [F]. So, for instance,
in a protocell, the maximum increase in [F] could be limited by the maximum permeability of the
membrane. Note that at this point we are still not considering any limitations coming from the struc-
ture of the environment itself or the capacities of the system to change those conditions (e.g., by
moving up a gradient of [F]).
There is a significant difference between the standard representation of a viability space in
Figure 1 and our representation in Figure 4. The first thing to note is that the viability space in our
approach is not only defined by a set of essential variables or just a constraint, but by a relational
property between internal variables ([A]) and environmental parameters or boundary conditions ([F]).
In addition, a viable region is not specified by a set of ad hoc or experimentally determined boundaries:
It is the result of the internal dynamics of the system in relation to the environment. The bifurcation
point and the boundary between two basins of attraction (the viable and the dead one) are the result
of the dynamics specified by metabolism. If we further explore the dynamics of the system within
this region we can move beyond a description of normativity in terms of boundaries and regions and
enrich it with the concept of field.3.2.2 The Normative Field
We can now introduce the notion of a normative field, defined by the minimal constant increase of
a behaviorally influenced variable, in this case [F], that is required at each point of the precarious
region in order to move the state of the system into a viable region before the system reaches theFigure 4. Regions in viability space: living, dead, viable, precarious, and terminal. The dead region or state lies at [A] = 0,
above which the living region appears. Inside the living region three different subregions are distinguished: the viable region
(light gray) where the system will remain alive if environmental conditions do not change, the precarious region (medium
gray) where the system is still alive but tends toward death unless environmental conditions change, and the terminal
region (dark gray) where the system will irreversibly fall into the dead region. See text for detailed explanation.16 Artificial Life Volume 20, Number 1
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the figure), the required increase of [F] is very big, since the tendency of [A] will soon push the
system into the terminal region. If the concentration of F is low but there is a lot of A, the required
constant increase in [F] is low, because the system has sufficient time to reach the viability boundary
before the tendency to die becomes irreversible. There are still rigid boundaries of a binary nature,
like the dead-living boundary at [A] = 0, but the notion of the normative field along the precarious
region permits us to define and quantify norms in a graded manner.
We have provided a minimal model of norm-establishing processes and how they define different
normative regions and dynamic normative fields. The goal of the next section is to see how norm-
following behavior can occur and how it maps into the normative field.4 Norm-Following: Chemotaxis and Normative Behavior
We now consider the possibility of influencing or modulating [F] through behavior. There are many
ways in which this could be accomplished. We consider two cases, both of which involve a motile
protocell (or bacterium) performing chemotaxis on a gradient of [F]. The first mechanism is a stochastic
mechanism inspired by the run-and-tumble behavior observed in bacteria such as Escherichia coli.
The second is a non-stochastic, perfect gradient-climbing mechanism in which the simulated organism
always moves directly up the [F] gradient.6Figure 5. Normative vector field. Vectors indicate direction and minimum amount of constant increase in [F] that is
required to get into the viable region before dying. See text for explanation.6 Note that the mathematical formalisms and results we are about to interpret as chemotaxis could, under some circumstances and
constraints, be interpreted in terms of more basic forms of agency in protocells that might not require motility: for example, the
regulation of membrane permeability and transport that affects the amount of metabolically available [F]. More realistic models of
protocell metabolic dynamics under different permeability conditions can be found in [53].
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4.1.1 Stochastic Gradient-Climbing
In this section, we extend the model described above, simulating the metabolism as being located
within a bacterium-like body that can move around a 2D environment. In the environment, F is
distributed according to a Gaussian gradient specified by the following formula (also, see Figure 6A):
½F ðx;yÞ ¼ exp x2 þ y2
  ð6Þ
The stochastic gradient-climbing behavior is inspired by the chemotaxis mechanism of E. coli [31],
which is based on the on the modulation of two types of motility: running, where the organism moves in
a straight line, and tumbling, a random reorientation of the organism. Running is a linear, constant-
velocity motion defined by the following differential equations: dxdt ¼ cosðaÞ; dydt ¼ sinðaÞ; dadt ¼ 0,
where a represents the orientation of the organism. A tumble is simulated by selecting a new value
for a from a flat distribution between 0 and 2k. Each tumble is always followed by a short cooldown
period (0.1t ) of running.
The run-tumble behavior of the organism is modulated by change in the concentration of F.
When [F] is increasing, the organism tends to run, and when it is decreasing, the organism tends
to tumble. This is simulated by calculating, at every iteration, an approximation U of the recent
change in the concentration of F that includes an error term:
U :¼ ½Ft − ½Fðt−0:01Þ þ q ð7Þ
When U ≥ 0, the simulated organism runs; otherwise (as long as it is not cooling down from
a recent tumble), it tumbles. The calculation of U includes the error term q, which is a random
number selected from a normal distribution with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.01.Figure 6. Trajectories of three stochastic gradient-climbing agents in 2D space (A) and the projection of the effect of
their behavior on the viability space. (A) Three agents start at different distances from the peak of the resource. These
typical trajectories ran for 5t (500 iterations), start at the Xʼs, and end at the closed circles. (B) Projection of the same
agentʼs trajectories within the viability space. Agent 1 fails to behaviorally compensate for its precariousness and dies,
whereas agents 2 and 3 remain alive within the viable region. Episodes of failure of agent 2 to correlate positively with the
normative field are marked with * and **.18 Artificial Life Volume 20, Number 1
X. E. Barandiaran and M. D. Egbert Norm-Establishing and Norm-Following in Autonomous AgencyThis error term means that the organism does not always make a correct evaluation of the change in
the concentration [F].
In most cases, if the organism starts reasonably close to the gradient, it exhibits statistical chemo-
tactic behavior, moving up the resource gradient. Figure 6A shows typical paths of three agents,
each started at a different distance from the peak resource. Figure 6B shows the evolution of
essential variables as a result of the agentʼs behavior, through the viability space, the same space as in
Figures 3−5, and 7. We see in Figure 6B that trajectory 2 starts in the precarious region, moves for
some time in correlation with the normative field, then moves away from the peak (marked with *),
and then turns into the viable region. Once there, it comes out of it (marked **) to return to the viable
region where it remains. It has survived a state that, in the absence of behavioral influence on [F], would
have led to its death, but it can be said to have made mistakes (marked * and **) on its way toward
regaining viability.
It is also the case that sometimes, despite performing chemotaxis, the simulated agents fail to
reach sufficiently high concentrations of F before they fall into the terminal irreversible region. Such
is the case of trajectory 1 in Figure 6, at the bottom line, where, after having moved slightly against
the gradient, it reaches a point around [A] = 2; there, despite being positively correlated with the
normative field, the overall behavior has been insufficient to reach the viable region, the agent
cannot behaviorally compensate for its precariousness, and it enters the terminal region.
4.1.2 Direct Gradient-Climbing
The mechanism just described has the overall statistical effect of moving the protocell up the resource
gradient. To simplify the analysis, we abstract the stochasticity of the mechanism, replacing it with a
continuous behavior that performs direct gradient-climbing. During this behavior, the organism always
moves directly up the resource gradient at a rate proportional to its distance from the peak—an approx-
imation of the overall effect of the stochastic gradient-climbing behavior. The removal of stochasticity
simplifies the dynamical analysis and allows us to more easily visualize the effect of behavior upon the
viability of the simulated agent.
The radial symmetry of the [F] gradient and the fact that the direct gradient-climbing only
involves axial motion allow us to reduce the number of spatial dimensions in our model. Now, a
single variable x, representing the distance of the organism from the peak of the resource gradient,
suffices. The following equation describes the gradient, relating [F] to x :
½F  ¼ 2e−x2 ð8Þ
We define dxdt ¼ −kmx, formalizing our definition of direct gradient-climbing mechanism. We then
derive the following differential equation in terms of [F], eliminating x from the model:
F ̇
  ¼ 2km  ln 2½F
 
½F ð9Þ
In our analysis, we take km, a constant indicating the speed of motion of the simulated organism,
to be 0.1.
To explore the influence of the direct gradient-climbing behavior on the viability space of the simu-
lated organism, we have superimposed streamlines indicating the trajectories with perfect gradient-
climbing behavior over the bifurcation diagram for fixed [F] (see Figure 7). With perfect gradient
climbing, the entire system has two stable equilibria (dead and living ) that are indicated with solid circles,
and a saddle node that is indicated with an open circle. All of these points are on the line [F]= 2.0. Also
indicated on this diagram by a bold curve is the streamline that ends at the saddle node. This path lies
along the basin boundary between initial conditions that lead to the living equilibrium and those thatArtificial Life Volume 20, Number 1 19
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the saddle node.
The effect of the direct gradient-climbing behavior upon the viability space of the simulated
organism can be seen in Figure 7. With [F] no longer fixed, but increasing as a result of behavior,
the space of initial values of [F] and [A] that fall into a stable living equilibrium point is greater than
that of the non-behaving model.4.2 Interpretation
4.2.1 Normative Behavior
Since [F] can be modulated by behavior (provided that the environment displays a gradient of [F]), a
sense of normative behavior can be precisely defined for every state of the system in the precarious
region: the amount of increase of [F] that behavior should achieve to compensate for its precarious-
ness, that is, the required movement in space that increases available [F] in accordance with the
normative field. To remove the ambiguity of the expression “in accordance with,” we can more
precisely define norm-following behavior as the course of behavior whose effect on the viability space positively
correlates with the normative field. Quantitative and qualitative aspects of this correlation can be distin-
guished. At the qualitative level, the projection of behavioral effects on the normative field can take
three different forms of correlation: positive, negative, or null. Whereas norm-following behavior is
that which is positively correlated with the normative field, negatively correlated behavior can be said
to be against the norm, and behavior that has no correlation can just be said to be neutral (only in a
sense relative to the correlation with the norm, since this “neutrality” is deadly for the system).7 At
the quantitative level one can measure how much a behavior matches the normative field. Note that
the system can fail to meet the norm, (i.e., to adapt) for a variety of causes (e.g., because there is notFigure 7. Superposition of direct gradient-climbing behavior upon the viability space: Whereas Figure 3 showed
the bifurcation diagram of [A] dynamics for fixed values of [F], here we show the effect of a perfect gradient-climbing
behavior (specified in Equation 9) on the viability space. Light gray identifies the space of the precarious region for which
behavior manages to reach the viable region. See text for details.7 A proper sense of “neutrality” is found within the viable region where the normative field is null.
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up the gradient—as in the case of the experiments illustrated in Figure 6). And yet, for some of these
cases of failure, behavior can be said to be in accordance with the norm, (i.e., a norm-following be-
havior) if it positively correlates with the normative field. Failure might be quantitative in these cases:
Despite the correlation with the normative field being positive, the agent does not move sufficiently
fast, and the behavior matches the direction of the normative vectors but not their length.
4.2.2 The Adapted, Adaptive, and Futile Regions
We have projected the relational agent-environment coupling effect on the viability space (as shown in
Figure 7) for a specific and stable environment and a deterministic and perfect behavioral capacity of the
agent. The resulting extension of the viable region we have termed the adaptive region, because this is the
area within the precarious region where behavior is capable of compensating for decay (see Figure 8).
Whereas the viable region can be said to be the space where the system is adapted (there is nothing
that the system has to do), this is the region where the system is adaptive (there is something that the
system has to do and it can do). Unlike the viable region, which is defined for all possible environ-
mental conditions, the adaptive region has to be defined in relation to both the structure of the en-
vironment (the gradient defined by Equation 8) and the behavioral capacities of the system (defined
by Equation 9).
An additional region can be added if we consider the limits of the agentʼs behavioral capacities and
the structure and limits of the environment (the space to the left of the gray area in Figure 7, where
all trajectories lead to death). We call this the futile region: no matter what it does, the agent will die,
because it lacks the appropriate behavioral capacity to modulate its environmental conditions—or
simply because the environment does not allow for it. So, for instance, if there is insufficient F
in the environment or if the chemotactic mechanism does not allow the protocell to move up the
gradient of [F] fast enough, the agent will die. Note that we have defined normative behavior as
behavior whose effects positively correlate with the normative field. As a result, within the futile
region the agent will be behaving normatively but without a real chance to survive (i.e., it is out of the
adaptive region). The futile region is specified by the organization of the metabolic system as well asFigure 8. Adapted, adaptive, and futile regions of the viability space. The projection of the agent-environment coupling
upon the viability space defines an adaptive region where the system is capable of compensating for its precariousness for
that particular coupling, and a futile region where the agent will inevitably die given its behavioral capacities and the
structure of the environment.Artificial Life Volume 20, Number 1 21
X. E. Barandiaran and M. D. Egbert Norm-Establishing and Norm-Following in Autonomous Agencybehavioral or environmental dynamics. This is unlike the terminal region, which is specified by factors
that are intrinsic to the organization of the system in a way that is independent of behavioral capacities
and environmental structure.5 Recapitulation: The Topology of the Viability Space; Some Generic Definitions
Abstracting away from our model and bringing together the set of distinctions we have made
throughout this article, we can now provide a set of generic definitions that might be applied to
other models of adaptive or normative agency and behavior.• Viability space: The space defined by the relationship between (a) the set of essential
variables representing the components, processes, or relationships that determine
the systemʼs organization and (b) the set of external parameters representing the
environmental conditions that are necessary for the systemʼs self-maintenance.
• Living region: The region of the viability space where a system maintains its ongoing
organization as a unity.
• Viable region: A region of the viability space where the evolution of essential variables, ceteris
paribus (i.e., given fixed environmental conditions), will remain within the living region.
That is, ∀xðtÞ ∈ V ⊂ L; xðt þ 1Þ ∈ V (where L and V stand for the living and viable
regions, respectively).
• Precarious region: A subregion of the living region where the system will reach death if the
environmental conditions do not change.
• Terminal region: A subregion of the living region where the system will reach death no matter
how the environmental conditions change.
• Normative field: For each point of the precarious region, the required minimal change of
environmental conditions necessary to bring the system back to a viable region or to a
precarious region of an opposing tendency.
• Normative action or norm-following behavior: System-driven modulation of the systemʼs coupling
with the environment whose effect on the viability space positively correlates with the
normative field.
• Adaptive region: A projection of the agent-environment coupling dynamics into the viability
space, specifying a subregion of the precarious region where from each point at least one
possible trajectory leads to viability.
• Futile region: A projection of the agent-environment coupling dynamics into the viability
space, specifying a subregion of the precarious region where all trajectories lead to death.Some aspects of the above definitions remain in need of further development; we shall briefly
mention some of them. The definitions of viability space and living region were provided for completeness,
but a more precise and justified definition of these terms is out of the scope of this article. Simi-
larly the term “essential variable” demands further explanation. For a protocellular system where a
membrane or some enclosing property (e.g., phase separation between oil droplet and water ) dis-
tinguishes a self-sustaining network of reactions from the environment, essential variables represent
those observables of a system that correspond to the capacity of the system to keep producing or
maintaining itself as a system distinguishable from its environment. The expression “ongoing organiza-
tion as a unity” also remains open to discussion and further clarification. For the purpose of this
article it suffices to indicate that at some point the essential variables of the system cease to represent
an observable of the system. This could be just because the system disappears as a result of the22 Artificial Life Volume 20, Number 1
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instance, if beyond a certain level of [A] the protocell bursts, then [A] is no longer the amount of
metabolites inside the membrane of an individual cell, but a measure of the concentration of A in
the environment (e.g., the Petri dish or pond where the bacterium was found before the bursting).
We have committed to a specific conception of life—inspired by [34, 38, 44, 57]—but the definitions
just provided do not strictly depend on it; other attempts to define life might be equally valid as long
as different processes could define and be mapped into the viability space. One could even proceed, to
some extent, without a definition of life and establish essential variables, environmental conditions, and
their boundaries experimentally (e.g., heart rate = 0).
We are aware that the conceptual framework of these definitions could be applied to biological
function more generally and not only to the issue of agency and normative behavior. Because our focus
of interest is agency, we have decided to narrow down the framework, making some simplifications that
could lead to confusion. So, for instance, we defined the viability space and its topology in relation to
“environmental conditions.” But what we consider to be environmental conditions could perfectly well
be internal conditions, and the relationship between agent and environment might be translated into
a part-whole relationship (e.g., the heart versus the conditions that the rest of the body creates for
it: oxygen supply, hormonal and neuronal activity, etc.).
We have modeled normativity at a single level of description and organization, one involving
a macroscopic description of metabolic dynamics and its coupling with the environment. What was
defined as a viable region at this level could perfectly well correspond to a precarious region at a lower
level of description and organization if observed in more detail. Most cases of natural normativity are
cases where various nested hierarchies of precarious processes constitute an organism, and so it is
only by fixing or assuming the normative functioning of lower levels that non-precarious viable regions
might be defined.
In our case the normative field was represented as a vector field, but could equally well have been a
scalar field, since there was a single viability parameter. More complex cases might require a tensor field
to express different routes to viability that are equally valid when different viable regions coexist within
the same viability space. It could also be the case that the viable region is very small or nonexistent,
depending on the particular topology of the viability space. For such cases, and others where viable
regions might still be in place, we have adapted the definition of normative field to include the condition
“to bring the system to a precarious region of an opposing tendency.” Although in our model it turns out to be
impossible to reach an opposing tendency without directly falling into the viable region, more complex
cases might permit the organism to remain indefinitely alive within the precarious region by navigating
opposing tendencies of essential variables. For more complicated models where there are multiple
environmental variables that influence the viability of the organism, identifying the normative field
might not be trivial. We do not address the problem of finding a universal way to determine a normative
field in this article. More complex models will be required to make progress in this direction.6 Discussion
The model we have presented here is still limited in a number of ways that we consider important.
However, we are now in a position to address them within the framework we have sketched. We
have no space to deal with these topics in detail, but we shall point them out briefly.
6.1 Virtuality, Multidimensionality, and Plasticity of Norms
6.1.1 The Virtual Nature of Norms
It follows from our analysis that norms have a virtual character. Norms are not mechanisms operating
on the system. There is nothing in the current state of the system that specifies the norm. Rather, it is in
the space of the possible dynamic evolutions of the system for different environmental conditions that
the normative vector field is found, in a conditional manner: what would happen if the system were toArtificial Life Volume 20, Number 1 23
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were to avoid death in the future. The organization of the system is the source of norms, but it makes
no sense to claim that norms themselves have any causal or regulatory effect.6.1.2 Multidimensionality of the Viability Space
The present model benefits from its low dimensionality in that it is easier to understand, but it also
suffers, perhaps, from being oversimplified in that there are really only two ways that the system
can vary. Real organisms are of course much more complex and would display a multidimensional
normative field and viability boundaries or surfaces. Richer topologies of the viability space might be
able to give rise to different phenomena. One of them is the existence of different viable regions
(in the form of islands in a viability space, separated by precarious regions) for the same organism,
that could define forms or regimes of viability and their associated forms of adaptation (that is, modes in
which behavior can compensate for precariousness around those viable regions).6.1.3 Plasticity of Norms
We have considered only fixed organizations that have no potential for change. Living systems are
plastic, meaning that certain organic functions can be expanded or reduced in their speed, tolerance,
rate, resistance, and so on. It is well known that animals, if progressively exposed to a poisonous
environment, can significantly increase their tolerance and survive levels of exposure that would kill
them quickly were those to arise suddenly. We have not considered a protocell that can change its
metabolism or its relationship with the environment under different conditions. But our model could
be expanded to address such cases. Examples of metabolic plasticity could include the activation of
different metabolic routes under different conditions so that the viable region might change (e.g.,
F is metabolized faster). An example of plasticity at the system-environment relationship level could
be the alteration of membrane properties: for example, if the protocell is exposed repeatedly to some
chemical in the environment that could, in turn, increase (or decrease) the inflow of F, the terminal
region could be expanded or reduced. Ruiz-Mirazo and Mavelli [53] provide a perfect illustration
of this notion of plasticity of boundaries; their model of a protocell includes the production of pep-
tides that change the elastic properties of the membrane, modifying the upper limit of the internal
concentration of metabolites that the protocell can reach before it bursts.6.2 Moving beyond Normative Behavior: Agency and Teleology
Up to this point we have studied norm-establishing dynamics on the one hand and behavior on the
other, and we were able to define behavior as normative, or norm-following, by mapping the effects of
behavior on the viability space and its normative field. Behavioral mechanisms in our model were
directly sensitive to [F], meaning they were assumed to be causally correlated with some environmental
quantity or value (as transmembrane receptors do in bacteria). In a sense, the mechanisms and dynamics
that produced behavior in our model were still dissociated from norm-establishing processes. In our
minimal system it happens to be the case that an increase in [F] is always good. As a result, mechanisms
as simple as those that can transduce variation in [F] into the appropriate motor output were capable
of following the norms (i.e., generating behavior that positively correlated with the normative field),
independently of the dynamics of [A]. A crucial point that we had to leave out of this article is the
requirement that some kind of causal-dynamical integration between norm-establishing and behavior-
generating mechanisms might be necessary to achieve a full sense of agency and teleology. A system
can follow a norm, yet do so blindly, without any causally relevant effect of norm-establishing processes
upon norm-following processes. Can we really say that such systems are agents? In cases like bacterial
chemotaxis it is assumed that natural selection has tuned sensor transduction mechanisms, sensorimotor
chemical pathways, and flagellar rotation speed and probabilities so that behavior turns out to be adap-
tive. But is there any possibility to address intrinsic teleology other than the blind watchmaker creating
organisms that behave normatively but are blind to their own norms?24 Artificial Life Volume 20, Number 1
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indeed possible. We can use the present model to explain this possibility. So, for instance, instead
of just tracking the increase of [F] in the environment, it is possible to make behavior dynamically
sensitive to [A] (or even some combination of [A] and [F]). In this way the system would be capable
of modulating its behavior in direct causal correlation with its viability dynamics and not just by
responding to external conditions. Note that this cannot happen if viability boundaries are externally
defined or contingently imposed on the viability space. This is why modeling the emergence of
intrinsic norms is crucial. In our model, the unstable equilibrium boundary that separates the viable
from the precarious region implies radically different dynamics for metabolism. Only when norms
emerge in this manner can norm-establishing and norm-following processes be connected in a
dynamically integrated manner.
The goal of this article has been to clarify the notion of “a system following norms that are gener-
ated by itself.” This is part of a larger body of research, where a great deal of interesting and exciting
work lies ahead. We have published on and continue to study the relationship between metabolic
dynamics and behavioral control in what we refer to as self-sensitivity—see [27] for a comprehensive view.
This research explores some of the consequences of what we have called metabolism-based chemotaxis in
bacteria [29] as opposed to the inherited concept of metabolism-independent forms of chemotaxis—a view
that has recently been challenged by experimental confirmation of many species of bacteria performing
various types of metabolism-dependent chemotaxis; see [1, 62]. The evolutionary and adaptive potential
of integrating metabolism and behavior was also explored in [28].
Also, previous work [5, 6] has focused on the possible limitations of biological agency in terms of
integrating norm-establishing processes with behavior-generating mechanisms, exploring instead the
concepts of autonomy and viability at the level of neurodynamics and behavior as a new domain where
properly behavioral or cognitive norms are to be found. We believe that exploring a deeper connection
between norm-establishing and norm-following processes will provide an insightful research avenue to
clarify the nature of teleology and agency.
Finally, we want to clarify that issues of normativity only relate to one of the three conditions that,
according to [7], define a system as an agent: (i) individuality, (ii) interactional asymmetry, and (iii)
normativity. The model presented in this article is therefore partial and is not intended to capture agency
as such, but just to address some of its constitutive properties (those related to normativity).8
7 Conclusions
One of the central challenges to naturalizing and synthesizing natural agents is the issue of normativity.
This article started with a short summary of some of the most relevant contributions to the charac-
terization of natural norms, focusing on the organizational, or organismic, approach. This school of
thought contends that norms emerge from the precarious and self-sustaining nature of living indi-
viduals, whose existence depends on the satisfaction of some environmental or boundary conditions.
But further progress is needed to articulate a scientifically fruitful theory that can be formalized and
modeled.
We identified two problems of previous modeling approaches to norms via the notion of viability
boundaries. The first problem has to do with the ad hoc imposition of norms on modeled systems and
the resultant rigidity of viability boundaries and absence of a normative gradation. In a circumvention of
this problem, we modeled the norm-establishing processes explicitly, allowing us to generate a viability
space with intrinsic boundaries and dynamic regions. This made it possible for us to derive the notion of
a normative field, enabling the quantification of normative behavior in a dynamical way that is richer8 It can even be argued that our model fails to satisfy the conditions of individuality and interactional asymmetry: (a) a single autocatalytic
reaction does not suffice to capture the relevant conditions for the emergence of biological individuality, and (b) a direct gradient-climbing
mechanism or a stochastic chemotaxis that is directly correlated with [F] does not satisfy the kind of asymmetry that characterizes agential
forms of sensorimotor coupling (the system is fully and deterministically driven by the current state of its environment).
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region avoids the standard rigidity of boundaries, generating a middle ground between the boundary
that separates viable and precarious regions and the boundary that separates precarious and terminal
regions. It is in this precarious middle ground where tendencies of essential variables are explicit and
can be compensated. Although our model did not address the possible plasticity or elasticity of such
boundaries, we considered possible expansions of the model to accommodate these phenomena.
We then introduced behavior-generating mechanisms and addressed the second identified problem:
the problem of dissociation between norm-establishing and norm-following dynamics. By mapping
the effect of behavior upon metabolism, we were able to assess the normative nature of particular
actions. We finally acknowledged the limitation of our current model, identifying the need tomake further
progress by integrating the dynamics of norm-establishing processes directly with those generating be-
havior, so as to avoid blindness to normativity and make progress toward a better understanding of
natural agency. Many open questions lie ahead. But the minimal model presented here (and the concep-
tual definitions and distinctions it has made possible) allow us, now, to formulate those questions more
precisely and move beyond the inspiring, but also limited, theoretical and philosophical approaches
that put the autonomy of the life, and its capacity to create norms, at the center of living phenomenology.
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